We identify four different minimal versions of the indispensability argument, falling under four difference varieties: an epistemic argument for semantic realism, an epistemic argument for platonism, and a non-epistemic version of both. We argue that most current formulations of the argument can be reconstructed by building upon the suggested minimal versions. Part of our discussion relies on a clarification of the notion of (in)dispensability as relational in character. We then present some substantive consequences of our inquiry for the philosophical significance of the indispensability argument, the most relevant of which being that both naturalism and confirmational holism can be dispensed with, contrary to what is held by many.
Introduction
The recent debate on the indispensability argument (henceforth, IA) in the philosophy of mathematics features an impressive number of versions of the argument, all somehow pointing back to what is referred to as "the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument", that is to Quine's several scattered remarks on the subject and to Putnam's [1971] first proper formulation of a version of IA. It is thus legitimate to wonder whether all (or, at least, most of) the versions available on the market can be really traced back to some minimal shared structure.
After rehearsing the most common stances towards IA, the main aim of this paper is to offer four minimal versions of IA, minimal in so far as they feature, according to classifications that will be explained below, the fewest or least controversial premises needed to gain the desired conclusion(s). We will submit that different formulations of IA on the market, related to the common stances to be discussed, could be retrieved from the argument to be a form of platonism, or rather a conclusion in favour of mathematical realism 2 . For our present purpose, it suffices that the two theses are acknowledged as distinct and both plausible: by platonism we mean, the thesis that there exist objects of a certain sort, namely such that our current mathematical theories can be taken to be about them, in short that there exist mathematical objects 3 ; by mathematical realism we mean a particular form of semantic realism, i.e. the thesis that the statements encompassed by our current mathematical theories, or better its theorems or consequences, are true (without specific commitment to what makes them true) 4 .
Puntnam's own views apart, his quotation above is commonly seen as a paradigmatic example of an argument for platonism. Prima facie, the Putnam's version of the argument appeals only two notions, indispensability and quantification. However, many believe that beside these notions, IA relies on some additional theses of Quinean provenance:
confirmational holism and naturalism. The most debated formulation of IA that is faithful to this conception has been advanced by Mark Colyvan's 5 : i) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only those entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories;
ii) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories;
------------------------------
iii) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities Baker [2009, p. 613] has claimed that "for the purposes of establishing platonism […] it needs to be shown that reference to mathematical objects sometimes plays an explanatory role in science". He has thus offered the following "Enhanced Indispensability Argument" (ibid.): i) We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity which plays an indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific theories;
ii) Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science;
iii) Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of to mathematical objects.
Finally, we have a fourth stance, represented by arguments that build on pragmatic considerations, or generally considerations concerned with scientific practice and its needs. The most representative argument in this case has been presented by Resnik [1995, pp. 169-171; 1997, pp. 46-7] 10 : i) In stating its laws and conducting its derivations science assumes the existence of many mathematical objects and the truth of much mathematics.
ii) These assumptions are indispensable to the pursuit of science; moreover, many of the important conclusions drawn from and within science could not be drawn without taking mathematical claims to be true.
iii) So we are justified in drawing conclusions from and within science only if we are justified in taking the mathematics used in science to be true.
iv)
We are justified in doing science.
v) The only way we know of doing science involves drawing conclusions from and within it.
------------------------------
vi) So, we are justified in taking that mathematics to be true.
------------------------------10
The argument is presented in slightly different terms in the two occasions. We are here using the one in Resnik [1995] .
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(vii) So, mathematics is true.
Setting apart any consideration about the validity of this version of IA, let us just notice that it differs from the previous versions to the extent that, as Resnik himself claims, it does not depend on the claim that "the evidence for science (one body of statements) is also evidence for its mathematical components (another body of statements)", but merely requires that "the justification for doing science (one act) also justifies our accepting as true such mathematics as science uses (another act)" 11 .
More recently, Azzouni [2009] has offered a reading of IA that is also based, though in rather different terms, on pragmatic considerations. More specifically, in a vein similar to ours (cf. footnote 17 below), Azzouni offers the following enthymematic "blueprint" for
IA:
Premise: Certain statements that quantify over mathematical entities are indispensable to science.
Conclusion: Those statements are true.
as underlying a family of arguments usually referred to as 'Quine-Putnam indispensability argument'. He then proposes to expand on this blueprint in order to offer what he labels the 'Assertoric-use QP', a version of IA based on the fact that what he calls the 'assertoric use' of mathematical statements is indispensable to science, and that this use commits speakers to the truth of the statements in question. We will consider Azzouni's proposal, together with what we take to be a plausible reconstruction of his Assertoric-use QP, in more details below in §6.
For the time being, it is important to acknowledge that four major stances emerge when looking at the different versions of IA actually on the market, hinging respectively on logico-syntactic considerations related to expressive power (as in Putnam) , on general views on science and confirmation (as in Colyvan) , on the notion of explanation (as in Baker) , and on features of scientific practice (as in Resnik or Azzouni) . It is relevant to emphasize this point, since if minimal versions of IA are to be offered, they should at 11 Resnik [1995, p. 171] . 6 least to be compatible with these common stances. It is not our intention to offer a minimal formulation corresponding to each of these representative arguments. However, we will discuss to which extent and how it is possible, from the minimal versions to be offered, to retrieve something very close to them, or at least as close as to fit with the same stances.
The Minimal Indispensability Argument(s)
Since our aim is to establish, with respect to available versions of IA, what a minimal argument needs retain, and what it can let go, we better start by considering the features of Colyvan's argument, which appears to be the most theoretically loaded version among the ones reviewed above. Here are some of its essential features. Firstly and obviously, it appeals to some notion of indispensability. Secondly, it is an argument for platonism, and not just for semantic realism. Thirdly, it is an argument stated in epistemic terms on two scores: on the one side, its premises and conclusions deal with what we "ought to"
believe, or what entities we "ought to" be ontologically committed to; on the other side, it deals with the notion of justification, since 'best', in "best scientific theories", should be understood as 'best justified' 12 . Fourthly, it appeals to the notion of ontological commitment; here, as in most cases, Quine's criterion ([QC] ) is the relevant one 13 . Fifthly, it is claimed to rely, for the justification of its first premise, on naturalism, and, sixthly and finally, on confirmational holism.
Are all of these features essential in order to obtain a version of IA? Obviously, any 12 Though Colyvan does not explicitly equate 'best' with 'best justified', the list of scientific virtues he considers in Colyvan [2001, pp. 78-9] for a scientific theory to count as good-among which are empirical adequacy, consistency, simplicity and parsimony, unificatory and explanatory power, boldness and fruitfulness, and formal elegance-makes clear that he (like other supporters of IA) has much more in mind than simply currently accepted theories. Notice, in passing, that the 'ought to', as opposed to the 'best justified', has both a permissive and a prescriptive component. We will not put much weight on the latter.
13
Cf. Colyvan [2001, pp. 22-24] for some qualifications. Briefly, [QC] states that the ontological commitment of a theory T is given by the objects that must be counted in the range of the objectual quantifiers in the existential theorems of (the canonical reformulation of) T. [QC] plays in Colyvan's argument the same role that quantification plays in Putnam's argument. Cf. Quine [1948] . 7 such version needs retain the first feature: it requires appeal to some notion of indispensability. But things are different with the other features.
Clearly, some criterion is needed for selecting those scientific theories to which the argument is meant to apply. One can, however, either appeal here to epistemic notions or to non-epistemic notions, such as truth. We thus get a first broad distinction between arguments stated in epistemic or in non-epistemic terms.
Further, as already remarked, IA can be an argument for mathematical realism, rather than platonism, and we need to keep the two possibilities apart.
We thus end up with four possible varieties of IA: as an epistemic argument for mathematical realism, as an epistemic argument for platonism, and, respectively, as a non-epistemic variety of each.
Let us begin with epistemic versions of IA for mathematical realism. As regards the selection criterion for theories, the most natural choice is for a criterion based on justification 14 . Justification, however, comes in many forms. For the time being, our appeal to it will be independent of any particular theory of justification. We could even not assume that justification for a theory is justification in believing the theory true:
having justification for a scientific theory could be understood as simply having reasons, even only pragmatic ones, for adopting a scientific theory in ordinary scientific practice -e.g. because it is instrumentally helpful, or predictively accurate, or the like. This would lead to an argument along the following lines: we have a justification for some scientific theories; among them, some are such that some mathematical theories are indispensable to them; we have a justification for these scientific theories only if we a have a justification for the mathematical theories that are indispensable to them; therefore, we have a justification for the mathematical theories indispensable to these scientific theories.
No mention of truth is made here. This is prima facie consistent with Colyvan's argument, where no mention of truth is made either. Admittedly, however, in the debate 14 Notice that a weaker notion, like that of acceptance of a scientific theory, modelled e.g. on the lines suggested by Van Fraassen [1980] , will not be strong enough to deliver the required mathematical realist or platonist conclusion. We will consider later the possibility of appealing merely to the notion of confirmation rather than that of justification.
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on IA-and in Colyvan's discussion too-justification is understood as justification for the truth of a theory. We can, then, specify the argument accordingly, and get the following version of IA:
We are justified in believing some scientific theories to be true;
[We are justified in believing T is true]
ii) Among them, some are such that some mathematical theories are indispensable to them;
[M is indispensable to T] iii) We are justified in believing true these scientific theories only if we are justified in believing true the mathematical theories that are indispensable to them;
[We are justified in believing T true only if we are justified in believing M true]
We are justified in believing true the mathematical theories indispensable to these scientific theories.
[We are justified in believing M true] In what follows, we will take [RE] as the reference formulation for a minimal epistemic version of IA for semantic realism.
[RE] is nothing but a specification of the more general argument sketched above, in which justification need not be justification for truth. Should we rest content with that more general argument, however, we could hardly obtain an argument for mathematical realism, for we would lack, unless further premises are added, any link between the justification of a theory and its truth (this is why we do not consider that version of the argument as one of our minimal versions of IA). 
The objects which the indispensable mathematical theories are about exist
[The objects M is about exist]
All these four minimal versions of IA are schematic, in more than one sense. First of all, 'T' and 'M', in the bracketed version of each premise, can be substituted, respectively, with particular scientific and mathematical theories. Furthermore, the meaning of 'indispensable', 'justification', 'true' in all four arguments can be specified in different ways, so as to get strictly different arguments according to which specification is chosen.
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Those who believe the first premise to be too harsh can still accept a weaker formulation in which that premise is discharged and the conclusion is conditional in form, i.e. 'If there are true theories, then ...'.
What is relevant is that the notions of justification and truth, however specified, must be such that justification in believing a theory true, and truth itself, are preserved under indispensability, however the latter is specified on its turn. In arguments for platonism, moreover, premise (iv) can be further qualified according to any preferred specification of the intuitive notion of aboutness (in Quinean terms, that premise would be specified, according to [QC] , by reference to quantifiers and their domain)
18
.
Prima facie, no such theses as naturalism, confirmational holism (or other) seem to be explicitly involved in the minimal arguments. But it remains open whether these (or other) theses are required, even as background assumptions, for the soundness of these arguments; this must be discussed in more details, especially if the relations between the minimal versions and the four representative versions of IA presented in the § 2 must be spelled out. We will first pause to discuss the notion of (in)dispensability in the next section, and then consider which assumptions and notions are really involved in the minimal arguments. The following discussion concerning both (in)dispensability and other relevant notions will also help clarifying how several versions of IA can be retrieved from our suggested minimal versions (cf. §6 below).
The relational character of (in)dispensability
Despite its obvious relevance for IA, the notion of (in)dispensability has undergone little specific analysis in the debate. Attractiveness and preferability are aim-specific notions, to be decided on broadly scientific criteria case by case. We can express this point in full generality by saying that T' has to be equally or even more scientifically virtuous than T, where the appropriate criterion of virtuosity will be fixed considering common scientific virtues, according to our specific purpose.
We can thus offer the following general clarification of the notion of (in)dispensability:
A theory M is dispensable from a given scientific theory T if and only if there is a scientific theory T' that does not include M-loaded statements and that:
a) is ε-equivalent to T, where ε is an appropriate equivalence relation; b) is equally or more virtuous than T according to an appropriate criterion of virtuosity a.
If T includes M-loaded statements, and there is no scientific theory T' satisfying the above conditions, then M is indispensable to T.
A noteworthy consequence of this definition is that common talk of (in)dispensability is partly inaccurate. No theory is (in)dispensable tout court to another theory, but only relative to a certain equivalence relation. We should better speak of ε-a-(in)dispensability, rather than (in)dispensability simpliciter. (In)dispensability is an essentially relational
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According to Craig's Theorem [Craig 1956 ], given a recursively enumerable theory T, and a partition of its vocabulary into an observational one, o, and a theoretical one, t, then there exist a recursively axiomatizable theory T', whose only non-logical vocabulary is o, comprising all and only the consequences of T expressible in o. Craig himself warned against the philosophical import of his result, claiming that the theorems of T' obtained by his re-axiomatization method are not "psychologically or mathematically […] perspicuous" than those of T, this being "basically due to the mechanical and artificial way in which they are produced" (p. 49). According to which equivalence relation is selected, IA can have different philosophical significance. Some minimal notion of indispensability can be thought of, if the equivalence relation ε is chosen on logico-syntactical grounds (e.g. if it is taken to be the relation of having the same expressive power, i.e. of including either the same theorems or definitional paraphrases of them). But more demanding notions can be thought of. For instance, one could suggest using such an the equivalence relation like that of having the same explanatory power, or cognate ones. Should theorists such as
Field and Baker, building on the third of the four stances mentioned in § 2, be willing to endorse any of the minimal IA suggested above, they could easily obtain a specification of them based on the notion of explanatory power: once ε is appropriately specified in this way, it will straightforwardly follows that M is indispensable to T only it plays an indispensable explanatory role in T. We will come back to this below 23 .
What Does It Takes to Be an Indispensability Argument?

22
Colyvan's discussion of "the role of confirmation theory" in his [2001, pp. 78-81] hints to the relational character of the notion of preferability. We take our clarification of (in)dispensability to improve on that suggestion.
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As pointed out to us by an anonymous referee, our schematic definition of (in)dispensability assign no special role to the notion of applicability of a mathematical theory. It goes without saying that we acknowledge the greatest importance to the problem of the applicability of mathematics and to its role within the debate concerning IA, although it is impossible to discuss these issues here. We do believe, however, that, although the two notions will be certainly connected eventually, they can be beneficially treated separately at a general level of analysis as ours. Whether and how a particular conception of applicability affects a given version of IA-either by facilitating its conclusion, or by preventing it-is, indeed, something that we believe will have to be considered case by case, according to versions of the argument appropriately specified so to involve, for instance, one's preferred notion of applicability in the specification of either the equivalence relation ε or the criterion of virtuosity α.
In this section we explore which assumptions or theoretical ingredients generally, beyond the notion of (in)dispensability, are required in order either to formulate or to endorse one of the minimal versions of IA presented above. We begin by considering the role of doctrines such as naturalism and confirmational holism. On a fairly common understanding-and in accordance with working definitions to be given below-these doctrines are only relevant for epistemic argument, being concerned as they are with the justification of scientific theories. Other assumptions will turn out as involved in nonepistemic arguments also.
Confirmational holism and naturalism
Nothing-and a fortiori naturalism and holism-is required, in [RE] or [PE] , to justify an all-and-only-clause like that in Colyvan's argument, simply because there is no such clause to be justified at all. However, these doctrines may still be thought to be necessary conditions for justifying some of the premises of those arguments. A related concern is whether either doctrines might represent sufficient conditions.
Apart for a some aspect to be considered shortly, we will take for granted a general understanding of the notions involved (and of the vast debate concerning their proper characterization), and will merely state them in a convenient form for future reference, taking it that these formulations are those that philosophers concerned with IA have most commonly in mind:
[CH] Confirmational Holism: [Since the appreciation of empirical evidence is in no way a matter of comparing a single fact with a single hypothesis,] the confirmation of a single hypothesis or of a system of hypotheses comes together with (or entails) the confirmation of a larger net of hypotheses (possibly of the whole net of hypotheses that our knowledge consists in).
[NAT] Naturalism: [Since scientific theories are the only source of genuine
knowledge,] we are justified in believing to be true only scientific theories, or other theories (or statements) whose truth follows from the truth of some scientific theories.
In what follows, we assume that it is legitimate to talk about the justification of mathematical and scientific theories independently of whether [CH] or [NAT] turn out to be necessary or unnecessary assumptions for the justification of any premise in the minimal arguments: [NAT] , by itself, tells us only which sort of theories can be true, but is not taken as constitutive of the notion of justification; and whereas confirmation could be seen as constitutive of the justification of empirical theories, the way in which confirmation is accrued need not be such: even if confirmation is holistic, the claim that a scientific theory is justified does not presuppose by itself [CH] .
If one wishes, [CH] and [NAT]
could be specifed further in order to have a distinctive focus on ontology, and would thus state, respectively, that the confirmation of a single hypothesis or of a system of hypotheses comes together with (or entails) the confirmation of the existence of all the entities that are quantified over in a larger net of hypotheses (possibly in the whole net of hypotheses that our knowledge consists in); and that we are justified in acknowledging the existence only of those entities that are quantified over in our scientific theories. In these particular formulations, naturalism and holism could be taken to be explicitly stated-not just posited as background assumptions-in the first premise of Colyvan's argument. . So we better concentrate on premises (i) and (iii), common to both arguments. Premise (i) is liable to the charge of surreptitiously appealing to naturalism, whereas premise (iii) is liable to the charge of surreptitiously appealing to holism. Let us consider the latter first.
Can we dispense with confirmational holism?
One could imagine a very simple way to settle the question whether endorsing holism is necessary for endorsing premise (iii) of [RE] It seems to us, however, that such a form of holism would be not only different from that which is usually at stake when the relation between holism and IA are discussed, which is confirmational holism proper, that is, a form of holism specifically concerned with confirmation, rather than with justification in general, but that it would also be a quite Pickwickian form of holism, since it would merely require that justification transmits from a theory T to another theory so intimately connected to it as the indispensability of the latter for the former implies. Of course, in order to admit that this is so, one should maintain that indispensability is so specified as to warrant this transmission. Still, this is not the point here. What is relevant is rather that such a form of holism would restrict the transmission of justification from theory to theory to a case in which the relevant theories are related by a certain sort of intimate connection. But, if a proper form of holism of justification should be defended, it should rather consists in claiming that justification transmits much more widely, along a larger net of theories or hypotheses (possibly along the whole net of hypotheses that our knowledge consists in), without constraints such as that of indispensability.
The situation would be even more outlandish if it were argued that the relevant form of holism consists in the claim that justification of a scientific theory S transmits to a mathematical theory M indispensable to S (since it would be odd to consider that a sort of holism concerned with justification, in general, is restricted to the consideration of scientific and mathematical theories) or that confirmational holism, as such, consists in the claim that justification of a scientific theory S transmits to a mathematical theory M indispensable to S (since it would be odd to consider that confirmational holism generally concerns justification, rather than confirmation). In this latter case, premise (iii) of [RE] or [PE] would just be the same as confirmational holism and it would be beyond doubt that that endorsing the latter is necessary for endorsing the former. It seems however 20 plain to us that confirmational holism is a different and wider thesis: not only it is concerned with confirmation rather than with justification, but also it is not merely limited to the transfer of confirmation from a scientific theory S to a mathematical theory M that is indispensable to S. All these considerations lead us to discard from the very beginning the simple possibilities just evoked, and to focus on confirmational holism proper, conceived as the
A first, preliminary, difficulty is the following. Apparently, there is a striking asymmetry between the condition expressed in premise (iii) and that expressed in [CH]:
the latter seems to express an inference from a part to the whole, whereas premise (iii) seems to express an inference from the whole to a part. We need therefore to understand how the two might be related in any way relevant (either sufficiently or necessarily) for lending support to premise (iii).
Under a quite weak reading if it, [CH] states that when a single hypothesis h of a theory S is confirmed, the whole S is confirmed, which we express in symbols by: 'C(h) → C(S)', where 'C(x)' stands for 'x is confirmed'. If we admit that a mathematical theory M involved in a scientific theory S counts as a cluster of hypotheses of S, one can replace here 'C(h)' with 'C(M)', so as to get the new implication 'C(M) → C(S)'. It is however clear that this implication (be it admissible or not) is hardly useful in an argument whose purpose is that of building on considerations about some scientific theories in order to draw conclusions about some mathematical theories appropriately connected to the former. At most, the reciprocal implication 'C(S) → C(M)' could be relevant. But if a mathematical theory M involved in a scientific theory S counts as a cluster of hypotheses of S, and we take confirmation to be cumulative, i.e. to be such that a conjunction of hypothesis (or of other items susceptible of confirmation) can only be confirmed by confirming all its conjuncts (which entails, of course, that confirmation is d'emblée also distributive: if a conjunction of hypothesis is confirmed all its conjuncts are so), this implication is trivial, since, whatever confirmation might come to in details, it is immediate to see that under this conception a theory cannot count as confirmed as a whole if some of its hypothesis are not so. Hence, in this case, arguing for this implication requires no appeal to any strong and/or controversial thesis, as confirmational holism appears to be. 
Is confirmational holism necessary for premise (iii)?
That confirmational holism might be unnecessary for IA has been already suggested, on different grounds, by several authors (e.g. Resnik [1995] Cf. Colyvan [2001] , p. 37: "As a matter of fact, the argument can be made to stand without confirmational holism: it's just that it is more secure with holism. The problem is that naturalism is somewhat vague about ontological commitment to the entities of our best scientifc theories. It quite clearly rules out entities not in our best scientifc theories, but there seems room for dispute about commitment to some of the entities that are in these theories. Holism helps to block such a move since, according to holism, it is the whole theory that is granted empirical support". For discussion of this passage and other issues connected with holism in Colyvan's framework, cf. Peressini [2003, pp. 220-222] .
Our first point is as follows. Under some conceptions of science, like falsificationism, the link between the confirmation of a scientific theory and its justification is severed. In such conceptions, empirical confirmation of the (testable) hypotheses of a scientific theory S, whatever advantages may it deliver, and whatever it might be considered to consist in, will not essentially contribute to the justification of S. Still, even if one endorsed such views, one may of course still maintain, under the weak condition, the S-M justificatory connection, and, a fortiori, the S-M justificatory connection under indispensability. Even if it is conceded that confirmation is holistic, i.e. that [CH] is true, the fact that C(S) → C(M) will simply play no role, in these views, to support the claim that J(S) → J(M), under whatever supplementary condition.
Another way of showing that, endorsing the implication 'C(S) → C(M)' is unnecessary
for endorsing that the S-M justificatory connection, under the weak condition, consists in noticing that this connection could be (vacuously) endorsed by anyone considered to have reasons for taking M to be justified independently of any consideration about its role in, or with respect to S (and, then, a fortiori, of M's being indispensable to S). This would be the case, for example, for anyone that considered to have a priori reasons for believing in the necessary truth of M (and would then, at most, take its indispensability to S together with S's being justified as a welcome by-product): the S-M justificatory connection (and, a fortiori, the S-M justificatory connection under indispensability) will be motivated without appealing to holism, nor to confirmation at all. This would make whatever empirical confirmation we can have for S (be its nature holistic or not) immaterial to the justification of M. Such an option will certainly not be welcomed by many supporters of IA. On the one hand, many of them also adopt a form of naturalism that ban a priori arguments. On the other hand, and most importantly, such an option seem to make IA Le us concede, now, both that (against the first point) empirical confirmation is an essential ingredient to the justification of a scientific theory (i.e. that J(S) → C(S)), and that (against the second point) we are after a defence of the S-M justificatory connection, under the weak condition, which is not based on having reasons independent of M's role in, or with respect to, S (possibly a priori ones) to believe in the necessary truth of M.
Since the S-M justificatory connection only consists in the implication 'J(S) → J(M)', for the other implication 'C(S) → C(M)' to be necessary for this connection it must be the case that (J(S) → J(M)) → (C(S) → C(M)). But once one explores ways of defending this
implication, it becomes apparent that it is unmotivated.
Insofar as we have conceded that confirmation of S is a necessary ingredient of its justification, what we have to consider is whether, under the weak condition, [(J(S) → C(S)) & (J(S) → J(M))] → (C(S) → C(M)). Suppose that S is justified. Then, for
the premise of this implication, it follows that S is also confirmed and that also M is justified. If this were enough for concluding that M is confirmed, under the weak condition, our implication would be verified. But, why should be so? It would be so if, once S is justified, and then confirmed, the only way in which its justification could be transferred to M, under the weak condition, were that S's confirmation transferred to M, and that M's confirmation were sufficient for its justification. But this is clearly unmotivated. Why should the only way in which justification of S transfers to M, under the weak condition, be through the transfer of S's confirmation to M? We have assumed that confirmation of S is necessary for its justification, not that it is also sufficient; so it could well be the case that M's justification be due, under the weak condition, to ingredients of S's justification other than its confirmation. Moreover, why (both under the 27 Putnam would clearly endorse premise (iii). But he has recently dispelled any doubt that his endorsing it hinges on holism: "I have never claimed that mathematics is 'confirmed' by its applications in physics"
(cf. Putnam [2012, p. 188] the grounds for arguing that C(S) → C(M) should be sought in that very fact, i.e. in whatever intimate connection is established between S and M by the very fact that the latter is indispensable to the former. This is not to take for granted that the notion of indispensability, under whatever specification, together with the admission that M is indispensable to S (under the relevant specification), will be able by itself to deliver these grounds. As a matter of fact, arguing that it is so does should be one of the main tasks of a supporter of IA. The point is just that, once the indispensability of M to S is assumed, it is reasonable to expect that it, and it alone, would allow to claim that C(S) → C(M One could claim, however, that some form of holism (presumably non-confirmational in nature) is somehow presupposed by any criterion of ontological commitment uniform across statements, namely in order to ensure that such a criterion uniformly applies both to scientific and to mathematical theories.
[(C(S) → J(S)) & (J(S) → J(M))] → (C(S) → C(M)
Against this latter supposition, one could argue, for example, that the notion of aboutness employed in premise (iv) cannot be given a content-neutral characterization, and does not apply to mathematical objects.
A case in point is Azzouni's [1998 Azzouni's [ , 2004 The former of these conditions could be questioned, but it seems to us to be safely admissible, in general, that is, for most of our scientific theories
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. For it is plausible to grant that, in general, any virtue a scientific theory may have will not confer justification to it in absence of confirmation.
The latter condition is more questionable, instead. One reason of this has already been at most this thesis would be involved in some particular instances of such an argument (just as it happens for IBE: cf. footnote 35 below).
One could, however, question this condition in some quite particular cases, as those involving highly theoretical physical theories, for example string theory. One could indeed maintain that in cases like these, the relevant scientific theories can be justified, and are actually considered to be so, independently of any empirical confirmation they may receive or have received. It is more likely, however, that in the complete absence of empirical confirmation we would not take ourselves to be justified, however weakly, in taking a scientific theory to be true; rather, such scientific theory will be said to enjoy a number of virtues that will merely make it acceptable in the scientific community for many practical and theoretical purposes.
Nonetheless, this form of acceptance, it goes without saying, will not be strong enough to support the conclusion(s) of IA, in any of the versions we have discussed here.
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mentioned: consenting to it requires admitting that mathematical theories are open to confirmation, which could be plausibly questioned (and is, in any case, nor required for endorsing IA). Another reason is that contending that confirmation of a mathematical theory, whatever it might be taken to be, is sufficient for its justification results in disregarding any a priori virtue that such a theory could have as a necessary ingredient of its justification. Finally, even someone, presumably endorsing a proto-empiricist view on mathematics, who is ready to admit that mathematical theories are open to confirmation, and that no a priori virtue of a mathematical theory is required for it to be justified (when it is well supported by a posteriori or empirical evidences) could face that the same difficulty raised above ( § 5.2.1) for the thesis that confirmation of a scientific theory is sufficient for its justification also applies, mutatis mutandis, in the case of mathematical theories.
Can we dispense with naturalism?
What about now premise (i) of [RE] and [PE]? Do we need to assume naturalism, in
any form, in order to claim that we are justified in believing some scientific theory to be true? What seems clear is that some form of scientific realism will have to be assumed.
For a fairly standard characterization, we can describe scientific realism as the thesis that our mature scientific theories are true, or, at least, approximately true descriptions of an external, mind-independent reality, that their statements should be interpreted at face value (both when they speak of observable entities and when they speak of theoretical ones), and that the objects of which they speak do inhabit the world (cf. Psillos [1999, p. xix] for a more extended definition on these lines). In order to defend premise (i) in
[RnE] and [PnE], we need to maintain that there are true scientific theories, and this implies a form of scientific realism. Moreover, some arguably milder form of scientific realism will be needed also for defending premise (i) in [RE] and [PE] . This milder form of realism should at least accept that we are justified in believing that there are true scientific theories (without necessarily taking the further step of claiming that there are, or were, or will be some such) 33 .
33
Notice that scientific realism, as formulated here, entails that (we are justified to believe that) the Now, scientific realism, in one form or other, is likely to be a basic assumption underlying naturalism. Quine himself listed "unregenerate realism" among the sources of naturalism (Quine [1975] , p. 72). But in order to justify premise (i) of [RE] and [PE] only some form of scientific realism is needed, and whereas naturalism implies (or might imply, depending on the chosen formulation) scientific realism, the latter does not imply the former. Where naturalism hinges on endorsing that scientific theories are the only source of genuine knowledge, with the result that we are justified in believing to be true only these theories or those whose truth follows from the latter's truth, scientific realism only implies that scientific theories are a kind of theories in whose truth we are allowed to be justified. This is not to deny that realism can be fruitfully combined with a naturalist position. It can even be maintained that the adoption of naturalism facilitates-since it implies it-the adoption of scientific realism. However, nothing prevents someone who believes, for example, that genuinely philosophical a priori arguments are a reliable source of knowledge, from believing, provided that conflicting results are avoided, that (mature, predictively successful, well-confirmed, etc.) scientific theories are sufficiently reliable sources too. It is not difficult to think of scientific realists that are not naturalists.
For an illustrious case, consider Frege, who had realistic views about scientific inquiry but surely was not a naturalist, as his views on mathematics show.
It then seems that insofar as endorsing [NAT] requires (entails) endorsing scientific realism, the former could thus well be a sufficient for endorsing premise (i) of [RE] and
[PE], but clearly it is not necessary 34 .
entities (both observable and theoretical) which are spoken of in mature scientific theories exist (at least, if we admit that a statement of a scientific theory cannot be true if these entities does not exist). Some remarks are in order. First, one may adopt forms of realism-e.g. structural realism-where the existence of these individual entities is not entailed; this version of realism would still be adequate to motivate premise (i) in all minimal arguments. Second, it would be odd to assume that scientific realism entails either the existence of the mathematical entities mentioned in mathematical statements, or that the mathematics used in science is true; assuming scientific realism does not beg the question with regards to the conclusion of neither platonist or realist versions of IA, and can be safely assumed in both.
34
To our knowledge, the only other version of IA which is explicitly claimed by its proponent to dispense with naturalism is the one offered by Azzouni [2009] . We'll discuss this below. justified, respectively, in believing true the relevant mathematical theories, and in believing the objects which these are about to exist. . It is instead not clear whether it also dispenses from naturalism. According to
Resnik himself the passage from its premise (vi) to (vii) is justified, by naturalism, which he briefly defines as the thesis that "natural science is our ultimate arbiter of truth and existence"
38
, and considers as suitable for ruling out scepticism about the justification and truth of our scientific theories. Still, it is not clear how naturalism can warrant the passage from the justification of some theories, and particularly of mathematical ones, to their truth, a passage which is surely hard to secure. More generally, it is far from clear that
Resnik argument be valid (or admit, at least, a valid rephrasing). It is thus not surprising that it is hard to retrieve it from our minimal versions, which are clearly valid. This remains, however, an unicum with respect to the ongoing debate.
Notice, on the other hand, that it is not clear whether the role played by the notion of justification in Resnik's argument is in any sense cognate to that played by it in our minimal arguments. We take justification as applying to statements or bodies of statements, and as being justification for their truth, and not just for their adoption for whatever practical reasons. Resnik does firstly conceives justification as applying (if not uniquely, also) to acts, rather than bodies of statements; and secondly he bases our 36 Discussion of the Enhanced Indispensability Argument often pertains to the alleged role that inference to the best explanation (IBE) may have in IA. Still, insofar as the minimal version of this argument, provided by [PE] under the mentioned specifications, is concerned, no appeal to IBE is required, and its validity need then not be presupposed. This does not mean that IBE cannot be involved in any specification of the minimal versions of IA. Indeed, it could be involved in some such specifications in two ways: the equivalence relation ε in the schematic definition of the notion of (in)dispensability could be specified through the notion of explanation in a way that presupposes the validity of IBE; or the criterion of virtuosity a in that same definition could itself presuppose the validity of IBE.
37
This is what Resnik himself seems to imply in the quote relative to footnote 10.
38 Resnik [1995, p. 166; 1997, p. 45] .
"accepting as true such mathematics as science uses" on the pragmatic reason that "we are justified in doing science" and that science, when considered in its practice, proceeds through various mathematical assumptions-and not rather on the fact that any scientific theory is even approximately true. If Resnik's argument were (valid and) sound, this could be see as an advantage, since it would make the argument independent of the supposition that some scientific theories are true. If (valid and) sound, this argument would thus dispense with scientific realism, as Resnik [1997, pp.46-47] suggests (and this should be so despite Resnik's quite doubtful claim that the passage from conclusion (vi)
to conclusion (vii) depends on naturalism, understood as the thesis that "natural science is our ultimate arbiter of truth and existence", a thesis which could hardly be taken as independent from a form of scientific realism).
Let us consider now Azzouni's argument, namely his Assertoric-use QP
39
. It deserves more careful consideration, since it is the one that comes closest to resembling, at least in spirit, some of our suggested minimal version, as least insofar as it is, and, as we said in § 2, explicitly meant to avoid presupposition of either holism or naturalism
40
. Also the distinction between arguments for mathematical realism and for platonism is suggested
by Azzouni [2004] , who questions [QC] and argues at length that IA can at most be an argument for the truth of mathematical theories, but that it falls short of supporting platonism 41 .
The first thing to be noticed is that Azzouni's Assertoric-use QP stems from an interpretation of the "enthymematic blueprint" quoted above in § 2, but is not regimented in the form of a codified non-enthymematic (valid) argument with enumerated and explicitly stated premises and conclusion(s). Enquiring whether it can be retrieved from one of our minimal versions of IA requires, then, a reinterpretation of Azzouni's proposals.
Prima facie, given that there is no mention of epistemic notions like justification in Cf. Azzouni [2009, p. 140-141] . 43 Ibidem, p. 141.
44
The sense in which we are justified in believing a mathematical statement true is meant, however, to be in some sense "stronger" [cf. Azzouni 2009, p. 147] than that licensed by Resnik's argument on pragmatic grounds: as Azzouni claims, "it isn't that we're 'justified' in describing an assertorically-used sentence as true; Tarski biconditionals make the use of the truth predicate nonnegotiable". Whatever this distinction comes to in details, it does not seem that from the assertoric use of a statement p the truth itself of p can follow, over and beyond our commitment to take p as true. Even if this entails that the conclusion of the Assertoric-use QP will be, as a matter of fact, a different, epistemic, version of the conclusion of Azzouni's proposed blueprint (i.e. 'Those statements are true'), we still see this as the most reasonable outcome of Azzouni's discussion; we acknowledge, however, that this reading can be subject to controversy depending on how our "commitment" to the truth of a statement is understood.
considered more minimal than [RE] ; and whether his version can indeed be retrieved from [RE] .
As to the first question, a clue for a positive answer could come from the fact that
[RE] appeals to the notion of truth (thought of as a schematic notion, variously specifiable), whereas Azzouni's argument doesn't explicitly appear to do so. Still, the latter relies on the fact that assertoric use of mathematical statements is indispensable to scientific practice, and this is taken to entail commitment to the truth of these statements just in virtue of the Tarskian biconditionals which "transform assertoric uses into truth-commit- Azzouni seems to indifferently use in his paper the terms 'sentence' and 'statement'. While maintaining the term 'sentence' in all our quotations from Azzouni's paper where it occurs, we shall, instead, invariably use the terms 'statement', as we do throughout our paper.
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Notice that no particular conception of truth is presupposed in our minimal versions, so that one is at liberty to use whatever notion one prefers in the specification of the schematic arguments (included a disquotational one). Hence, the question here is not whether we, as opposed to Azzouni, make use of some particular conception of truth, but whether any notion of truth is involved at all in the relevant versions of IA.
49 Azzouni [2009], p. 144. the scientific sentences themselves (given a commitment to the scientific project)", where the term 'au-indispensability' is a shortened form of 'indispensability of the assertoric use'. It seems, moreover, plausible, in the light of our previous discussion, to understand the commitment to the scientific project as a justification in the truth of these scientific statements, and then, presumably, in some scientific theories.
Be that as it may, these considerations suggest that Azzouni's argument is possibly not to be considered more minimal than [RE] , but rather very close to it, at least in spirit. We should then move to our second question.
What we have said so far suggests to specify both the single premise and the conclusion of Azzouni's blueprint by making explicit the assumption of our commitment to the scientific project intended as a commitment to (the truth) of those statements whose assortoric use is indispensable to this project, and to state the conclusion in an epistemic form. The ensuing formulation will thus be this:
Assertoric-use QP (I)
i) We are committed to (the truth of) those statements that are au-indispensable to the scientific project;
ii) Some statements that quantify over mathematical entities are au-indispensable to the scientific project;
We are committed to (the truth of) these statements.
Above we have mentioned the accompanying premise of Azzouni's argument concerning the "au-indispensability of the scientific sentences themselves". The whole passage where this premises is put forward seems to suggest that the indispensability of the assertoric use of the relevant statements that quantify over mathematical entities is to be, as it were, split into the au-indispensability of both some scientific and some mathematical statements. It goes as follows The reference is, of course, the same as in footnote (48).
sentences themselves (given a commitment to the scientific project)". 
We are committed to (the truth of) these mathematical statements.
This latter version of IA is clearly similar, in structure and content, to [RE] . Once it is conceded that 'being commitment to the scientific project' can be interpreted as 'being justified in believing some scientific theories to be true ', premise (i) Notice also that Azzouni explicitly objects to forms of fictionalism that constitute the most obvious strategies for rejecting premise (iii). In the following passage (Azzouni [2009] , p. 143), it is easy so read something very close to the suggested specification of premise (iii) of [RE]:
One issue to be explored in this paper is whether the assertoric use of many statements of ordinary science is compatible with one or another construal of the mathematical statements utilized in science as not assertorically used (and therefore, as either not true-apt or as false). I'll show that a position that takes us as truthcommitted to statements in any area where mathematics is applied, while assuming that we aren't simultaneously truth-committed to that mathematics, is unstable.
This, if needed, seems to be another piece of evidence that premise (iii) can be upheld without appealing to confirmational holism. Argument', and discuss the alleged dependence of the argument on these doctrines. For example, Maddy [1992 Maddy [ , 2007 claims that IA fails because of inescapable clashes between the notions of holism and naturalism (as Quine conceived of it) and essential features of mathematical and scientific practice and methodology; relying on a nonholistic notion of confirmation, Sober [1993] argues that empirical evidence cannot even indirectly justify mathematical theories.
As it turns out, minimal versions of IA can be devised that are far less demanding than the so-called Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. Only scientific realism (beyond, obviously, a proper characterization of (in)dispensability) will be an essential ingredient in justifying premise (i) in [RE] and [RnE] . In order to obtain a platonist conclusion, thus This is an obvious philosophical outcome for versions of IA that proceed under the assumption of naturalism and deliver necessary conditions for their conclusions (cf. the end of § 5.3). But this need not be so: when naturalism is left out of the picture, the argument only gives sufficient conditions for either semantic realism or platonism.
Clearly, if we espouse a naturalist ideology, we will better make our argument for mathematical (semantic or ontological) realism rely, more or less explicitly, on naturalism, and thus secure (semantic or ontological) realism in a way that is consistent with our naturalist viewpoint. But it is not, as it were, in the very nature of IA to give sufficient and necessary conditions for its conclusions. It might just be our particular interest to have a version of it giving both.
IA is not a naturalist argument per se. We see no ban in principle, for those who believe in the a priori character of mathematical truths, against the acceptance of Quine's reluctant acceptance of platonism, like assuming something special about mathematics and building a form of IA on this (contrary to what is suggested by Steiner's [1978, pp. 19-20] "transcendental" interpretation of IA). The special character of mathematics seems rather to be proved by the very fact that we cannot dispense with it in science. All posits are ontologically on a par until we are faced, as Quine would call it, with an unabridged language of science. Not all posits will come out indispensable.
Propositions and meanings don't. Mathematics does.
55 Shapiro [2005] , pp. 13-14. Shapiro remarks is only cursorily made, and nothing special hinges on it in his discussion; we just take it as an indication of a widespread feeling.
indispensability arguments
56
. Modest anti-naturalists of this sort 57 will claim at most that IA is superfluous, or ancillary, since they can offer reasons for the same conclusion(s) that are by far more certain than the contingent grounds on which IA hinges. But this is definitely different from rejecting the argument.
The point is that the real anathema for all those philosophers listed by Shapiro in his quotation is not IA itself: it is naturalism. Any argument relying on naturalism will be anathema for them: IA can, but need not, be a good candidate.
On this respect, it is remarkable that, after long time, show-as already suggested in Putnam [1971] and [1975b] -that it is incoherent to adopt scientific realism and at the same time reject (semantic) realism about mathematics.
Moreover, he was explicit in claiming that At the very least, our conclusions can be seen as a way of setting the debate straight to its origin, and showing that the minimal versions of IA are more closely related than others to Putnam's argument.
Some of Frege's remarks [1893 Frege's remarks [ -1903 have sometimes be taken as a statement of a form of IA in nuce (but see Garavaso [2005] and Sereni [2013] ). But it would be utterly implausible to claim that anything like IA was Frege's main argument for believing in the existence of mathematical objects.
57
Radical anti-naturalists, like sceptics, would deny that science is any source of knowledge at all.
58
Cf. Putnam [2012, p. 183 ].
59
Ibid. The 'in a sense' qualification concerns Quinean themes (indeterminacy of translation, differences with a standard realist view of language) discussed in Putnam [1988] . as it were, the mark of existence for mathematical objects, then the objects of unapplied mathematics are banned from our ontology.
It is indeed possible to maintain a version of IA for which naturalism is necessary. This argument delivers the sort of platonism that Quine endorsed. But this argument is in tension with many forms of platonism, which would not distinguish among the ontological rights of different parts of mathematics, not at least on grounds of applicability and indispensability (Maddy has long insisted on this; see e.g. Maddy [2005] ). It could even be argued that such an argument is not an argument for platonism (as standardly conceived), but rather for the proto-empirical (or "quasi-empirical", to borrow from Putnam [1975b, p. 62] 
62
) character of mathematics.
Versions of IA giving only sufficient conditions leave open the possibility that we are justified in believing that unapplied mathematical theories are true, or that the objects they are about exist, wholly independently of IA: IA is understood as an argument for 60 Quine [1986, p. 400] . In later writings, Quine admitted that this would create an unjustifiable asymmetry between different parts of mathematics, hence he resorted to the idea that we cannot completely deny meaningfulness to unapplied parts of mathematics, but that we can arbitrarily decide whether to call those parts true or false (cf. Quine [1995, p. 56-57] ).
61
Cf. Parsons [1983] , Maddy [1992] , Leng [2002; 2010] , Colyvan [2007] . Putnam [1971] , p. 346-7, suggests a view similar to Quine's on unapplied mathematics. His is however a milder position (unapplied mathematics "should today be investigated in an 'if-then' spirit"), and he is wary of restricting his claims to "the case for 'realism' developed in the present section".
62
According to Putnam [1975b] , mathematics could count as quasi-empirical in that we can account for it in terms of quasi-empirical methods of inquiries (other than deductive proof from axioms) based on successful applications. This is for Putnam consistent with a non-platonist interpretation of mathematics.
If Quine suggests that a proper indispensability argument hinges on naturalism, then, it is only because he was a naturalist on independent grounds in the first place. Nothing in the argument mandates that this is so. That is just an example of the philosophical use of the argument (in a non-minimal version) that can be made in an empiricist framework. It is not a philosophical outcome that the argument can secure by itself.
